This article proposes a simultaneous probit equation framework to analyse the business ownership patterns of married couples in the United States. A structural model of knowledge spillovers within couples is formulated and estimated. Empirical analysis reveals significant and substantial positive interdependence of business ownership propensities within couples. We argue that the evidence is consistent with both male and female spouses receiving positive knowledge transfers from the other. Conversely, there appears to be little support for alternative explanations of interdependent occupational choices based on assortative mating, role model effects, risk diversification, or intrahousehold wealth transfers. We conclude that the conventional practice of ignoring occupational interdependence can generate misleading conclusions about the determinants of business ownership in America.
Introduction
Research into the determinants of entrepreneurship continues to grow, with recent contributions emphasising borrowing constraints (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) ; human capital (Lazear, 2002 (Lazear, , 2004 ; geographical location (Acs et al, 2004) , and ethnicity (Fairlie and Meyer, 1996; Fairlie, 2004) . There is now a rich body of knowledge about the individualspeci…c factors associated with the decision to be an entrepreneur. The literature has also begun to extend into the domain of the family, re ‡ecting growing recognition of the disproportionate number of married entrepreneurs (Blanch ‡ower and Meyer, 1994; Bates, 1995) ; parental in ‡uence on self-employment choices (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000) ; and the growing interest in female entrepreneurship and the role of their husbands (Caputo and Dolinsky, 1998; Bruce, 1999) . However, the literature has largely ignored the possibility that an individual's decision to be an entrepreneur might both a¤ect and be a¤ected by the entrepreneurial propensities of their marital partner. This is re ‡ected by the fact that the studies cited above are based on single equation logit or probit models of occupational choice, which invoke strong assumptions about the exogeneity of outside in ‡uences on the decision to be an entrepreneur.
The present article shifts the spotlight of economic entrepreneurship research away from the individual and on to the family unit. Building on the observation that couples comprise the majority of business owners in America, we propose a new approach to estimating a family model of entrepreneurship participation for married couples. 1 At the core of the paper is the notion of knowledge spillovers, which captures the idea that information and knowledge about business ownership and business conditions can be shared easily and e¢ ciently between spouses. 2 But we also recognise that there might be favourable opportunities for spouses to …nd complementary occupational mixtures, and embed this possibility into the analysis as well;
and we go on to consider the impact of household risk-sharing on diversi…-cation or concentration of entrepreneurship within couples. We treat each spouse's occupational choice as endogenous, and derive from a simple theoretical framework an estimable simultaneous equation probit model. This is estimated using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data. When interpreting the results, we perform a series of robustness checks in an attempt to distinguish knowledge spillovers from other possible explanations of interdependent occupational choice, including role model e¤ects, intra-household wealth transfers, assortative mating, and risk diversi…cation. The longitudinal dimension of the PSID is used to dig into these alternative explanations.
Con…rming the usefulness of analysing entrepreneurship participation at the family level, we …nd strong evidence of positive interdependence in business ownership, with both male and female entrepreneurs receiving positive spillovers from the other. Furthermore, the e¤ects appear to be substantial in economic terms. Depending on the particular econometric speci…cation used, husbands whose wife is certain of being a business owner have on average a 12-20 percentage point higher probability of being a business owner than if they were married to a woman who was certain not to be a business owner. The corresponding …gure for women is 9-14 percentage points. This compares with the unconditional probability of being a business owner in our sample of 13.3% for men and 6.8% for women. Spillover e¤ects appear 2 See, e.g., Wong (1986) . Spillovers have not been extensively analysed in the context of household decision making or occupational choice, in sharp contrast to other areas of economics including productivity (Moretti, 2004) ; economic growth (Holod and Reed, 2004) ; innovation (Sena, 2004) and labour mobility (Berliant et al, 2002) . not only to be large, but also play an important part in explaining patterns of male and female business ownership. We conclude that ignoring interdependence can generate misleading conclusions about the determinants of business ownership in America.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple modelling framework to analyse interdependent occupational choice. Section 3 derives from it an estimable econometric speci…cation and discusses estimation and identi…cation issues. Section 4 describes the sample data. Section 5 presents and discusses the econometric results. Section 6 concludes.
Model framework
This section has three parts. The …rst outlines the notation and assumptions. The second part derives results assuming certainty about future incomes, while the third analyses the e¤ects of introducing risk.
Notation and assumptions
There are n households denoted by i, each of which comprises two individuals denoted by g and g 0 : (g; g 0 ) 2 f1; 2g; g 6 = g 0 . Person g in household i is denoted by (g; i). There is a single time period, in which all incomes are spent on a composite good. Each individual can enter one of two occupations, indexed by j: j 2 fb; pg. Denote (g; i)'s available income in occupation b (business ownership, or 'entrepreneurship') by y gib and in p by y gip . Incomes in b are stochastic, and relative to those in p attract a random return gi , with mean gi ; incomes in p are certain. Initially, we shall suppose that each individual who chooses b observes their own actual or potential gi , and also their spouse's g 0 i , at the start of the period -so they make decisions not only simultaneously but also under certainty. This 5 assumption will be relaxed below.
To simplify the analysis, we abstract from leisure, assuming that incomes in each occupation are positive if and only if a single unit of labour is supplied. Choices about whether to engage in household or market production are also taken as given, and will not be modelled as endogenous variables.
While it would undoubtedly be interesting to relax these assumptions, this would entail numerous complications, which take us beyond the scope of this article.
If and only if both g and g 0 choose b, then g receives a spillover g and g 0 receives g 0 . (This allows for possible gender di¤erences in the value of spillovers from joint entrepreneurship.) By being an entrepreneur, an individual might make his or her spouse more productive by sharing their business information and experience either in a separate or a joint venture; then g > 0 in (1) below. Alternatively, an entrepreneur might bene…t if their spouse is an employee, in a complementary occupation, e.g., corporate taxation, or as an employee of their company.Then g < 0 in the following description of (g; i)'s relative occupational incomes:
for g = 1; 2. For simplicity we shall for now take gi and g 0 i to be uncorrelated with each other. Being idiosyncratic, the s are unobserved by the econometrician. 3 For ease of use below, de…ne := g + g 0 and := =2.
For simplicity, it is assumed that individuals share household income and determine their occupational choices at the same time as their spouse does.
For example, (g; i)'s objective is
taking (g 0 ; i)'s occupational choice (denoted by j g 0 i ) as given; where I is household non-labour income; X gi is a vector of characteristics associated with (g; i)'s preferences; and U ( ) is a quasi-concave function. 4 Notice that this model embodies co-operative behaviour. Alternative approaches are certainly possible, e.g., non-co-operative decision making (Kooreman, 1994) , or co-operative bargaining. We will discuss later the implications of alternative speci…cations for the interpretation of the econometric model.
The case of certain returns
In this section, we analyse the occupational choice decision of married couples under conditions of certainty. We treat the case of positive spillovers explicitly below; the analysis for negative spillovers goes through analogously and will not be repeated. In Section 2.3 we analyse the implications of individuals being uncertain about their stochastic incomes before choosing whether to become an entrepreneur.
It is convenient to move from a speci…cation of relative incomes, as in
(1), to one framed in terms of absolute incomes. In the case of positive whose endogenous variables are latent rather than observed dichotomous variables. This avoids problems of being forced to impose identifying restrictions on a simultaneous equation dummy variable model that e¤ectively remove interdependence from the econometric speci…cation altogether. See Maddala (1983) for a discussion. 4 Replacing (2) with an alternative preference structure of altruistic but separable utility would not of itself carry any special implications for occupational interdependence.
spillovers from b, i.e., g ; g 0 > 0, we replace (1) with y gip = y ip > 0 and y gib = 8 > > > > < > > > > :
The econometrician does not observe the s, so let z gi denote the econometrician's subjective probability that (g; i) will choose b at a given point in time. Because spouses' decisions are made simultaneously rather than sequentially, this probability is determined jointly with the probability of their spouse's decision rather than being conditional on it. Using (2), we
Likewise
Eqs. (3) and (4) are the probabilities that (g; i) and (g 0 ; i) choose to be entrepreneurs summed over both possibilities of their spouse being and not being an entrepreneur. They are the econometrician's structural equations 8 describing joint occupational choice. One can easily obtain reduced form solutions for these two equations (see Section 3 below).
The positive spillover renders (3) and (4) interdependent. To see this, it is su¢ cient to examine the (purely illustrative) case when the utility function (2) is separable in its two arguments. Then (3) and (4) become
where the econometrician's subjective probability distributions of the s map each of the Pr expressions into positive constants (which are increasing in gi , g 0 i ). With > 0 it is evident that the two individuals'probabilities of becoming an entrepreneur (i.e., z 1i and z 2i ) are positively related. The reason is that the household bene…ts from a spillover in b only if the other person chooses b as well.
As noted above, the case of negative spillovers can be treated analogously. It is easily shown that z 1i and z 2i are negatively related in this case, because a mutually bene…cial spillover is only realised if the other person chooses the alternative occupation.
Introducing risk
So far, we have considered the case where individuals know their own and their spouse's stochastic income realisation in b before choosing their occupation. We now relax that assumption, and suppose that individuals face uncertainty about both their own and their spouse's shock. It is tacitly assumed that some kind of cost prevents individuals from switching occupation immediately after ( gi ; g 0 i ) are revealed, and thereby dodging an adverse shock. Individuals are still assumed to know the probability distribution from which the stochastic realisations are drawn. As before, however, the econometrician has incomplete information so once again we will end up with a probabilistic econometric choice model.
The basic ideas below can be illustrated most easily by taking a special parameterisation of the model: I = gi = g 0 i = 0 with U separable. To reduce notational clutter, we will also drop the i subscript in the remainder of this section. Consider the simple speci…cation
where ! g and ! g 0 are independent mean-zero realisations of some random variables. So if = 0, g and g 0 are independent (the case considered in the previous section); if = 1, there is perfect covariant risk; and if = 1, risk is completely diversi…ed provided both individuals choose the risky occupation b. 5 Below, we will …nd it useful to assume two-point distributions of ! g and ! g 0 to make our point, which both take the value e > 0 with probability 0.5 and e < 0 also with probability 0.5. The econometrician is ignorant about e.
It should be stressed at the outset that, starting from the position of To see the e¤ect of covariant risk most starkly, consider the case where = 1. Then (3) becomes
By inspection, if e = 0 (no risk) and > 0 then z g = z g 0 ; while lim e!1 z g = 0 irrespective of z g 0 . 6 Hence covariant risk implies a weaker relationship between z 1 and z 2 of (5) and (6) than in the case of no risk analysed earlier, eroding the e¤ect of any positive spillovers.
If on the other hand risk is diversifying, a case which is illustrated most clearly by = 1, then income risk from one spouse is completely o¤set by the other if both choose b (but not otherwise). Now if 0 we have 
An econometric speci…cation
In this section we propose an empirical counterpart to the structural equations of entrepreneurial choice established in the previous section. We then discuss some estimation issues before considering possible ways of identifying knowledge spillovers from alternative explanations of interdependent entrepreneurship.
Deriving the empirical model
To derive an empirical counterpart to the theoretical framework just described, we propose the following speci…cations of productivity in entrepreto that in b, as well as the occupation-speci…c values. Arguably, this issue is attenuated if a business owner/non-business owner classi…cation is used, as in our empirical application, because if employers smooth employees'wages, one can then more plausibly ignore risk in p.
neurship and household preferences:
where g ; gj and d g > 0 are parameters. Eq. (10) speci…es an individual's expected income in entrepreneurship relative to income in paid employment to be a linear function of a set of individual-and gender-speci…c variables,
The impact of these variables might vary systematically by gender (hence the g subscript on g ), because females are observed to have a different structure of returns in entrepreneurship than males (Parker, 2004; van Praag, 2005) . Eq. (11) de…nes a set of mean-zero uniformly distributed random shocks gi that are observed by members of each household i but not by the econometrician. The form in (11) incorporates gender di¤erences in the distribution of shocks, to permit gender-speci…c income risk in business ownership. 9 And (12) speci…es a tractable non-separable functional form for the utility function, in which pecuniary returns and non-pecuniary individual-and gender-speci…c covariates X gi a¤ect utility via the parameter vector gj . 10 The occupation subscript on gj allows the e¤ects of some characteristics to impact more on preferences in some occupations than in others. This respects previous empirical …ndings which suggest that un-observed preferences are needed to help explain rates of participation in entrepreneurship among some ethnic groups. 11
Substituting these speci…cations into (3) and (4) (or equivalently their counterparts for < 0) yields in either case the estimable system
where
and where u 1i and u 2i are exchangeable gaussian error terms, to capture the possibility of measurement error. Note the testable restriction sgn( 1 )= sgn( 2 )= sgn( ). The model given as (13) and (14) is a simultaneous equation probit model. It is internally consistent and estimable under standard identi…cation assumptions described in Section 3.2 below. 12
In the context of married (employee) couples' work hours, Lundberg (1988) asserted that a simultaneous structure like (13) and (14) nests within it several behavioural models, including joint utility, exogenous spouse choice, and co-operative bargaining models. Applying the same logic here, one might associate the case where 1 and 2 are both signi…cantly di¤erent from zero with joint utility or co-operative bargaining models; and the case where at least one of 1 or 2 equals zero with exogenous spouse choice. The 1 1 See Fairlie and Meyer (1996) and Fairlie (2004) . We observe that adding (7) and (8) to the speci…cation (10)-(12) for general does not alter the form of the econometric speci…cation derived below; so that speci…cation appears to be applicable irrespective of the type of risk faced by entrepreneurs.
1 2 In contrast, a version of the model where dummy variables appear in place of the latent endogenous variables is not internally consistent (see Kooreman, 1994). latter case has been the norm in the empirical entrepreneurship literature to date. 13 To obtain the reduced form of the model associated with (13) and (14) 
and
Note that the econometrician only observes the indicator variables z 1i and z 2i , where z 1i = 1 if z 1i 0:5 and = 0 otherwise, with z 2i de…ned likewise. 14 The coe¢ cients of central interest in these speci…cations are 1 and 2 , because they capture interdependent entrepreneurial choices which are predicted to arise in the presence of knowledge spillovers. Our conceptual framework suggested that the signs of these coe¢ cients re ‡ect whether knowledge spillovers are con…ned within entrepreneurship (in which case they should be positive); or require complementary occupations to become manifest (in which case they should be negative). And, in the absence of suitable empirical controls for risk, the impact on 1 and 2 depends on whether risk is covariant or diversifying. Naturally, estimates of zero imply that any knowledge spillovers are either irrelevant (perhaps because of exogenous rather than joint spouse decision-making), or are completely o¤set by risk e¤ects.
In either case, one can treat entrepreneurial choices of spouses as e¤ectively independent of each other. 15 We note in passing that ignoring interdependence in entrepreneurial choices when it is actually present, i.e., taking the 'conventional'course of interpreting the coe¢ cients in single equation estimations of (16) and (18) as structural rather than reduced form parameters, could generate misleading inferences. This warning is of practical relevance because most empirical studies of business ownership do precisely this. To see how misleading this can be, suppose that 1 2 > 1 (an empirically relevant case, as shown below). Then by inspection of (15) and (17), the structural and reduced form parameters could take systematically opposite signs, leading to precisely the wrong interpretations.
di¤erence where within the (closed) unit interval the threshold is set. 1 5 This includes the case where spillovers received by women are equal and opposite to those received by men: g = g 0 , for then = = 0. In a joint utility model only the combined spillover matters; this is why its gender-speci…c components are not identi…ed in the empirical speci…cation (though see the discussion in footnote 14 above with respect to household bargaining models).
Estimation issues
There are two principal ways of estimating the simultaneous probit model (13) and (14). One is to use a consistent two-step estimator (2SE) proposed by Maddala (1983, Chap. 8.8) ; the other is to use full information maximum likelihood (FIML).
The 2SE estimator involves estimating the reduced forms (16) and (18) by single equation probit ML at the …rst stage. This generates 'predicted latent values' of entrepreneurial choices based on the …rst stage estimates.
The second stage then includes these predicted latent values in place of z 2i and z 1i in the structural equations (13) and (14). Estimation of the latter by ML generates consistent estimates of all of the parameters, but requires a correction to the parameter variance-covariance matrix owing to the use of 'generated regressors'. 16 Identifying assumptions for this model are that there is at least one member of 1 that does not belong to 2 and vice-versa (i.e., neither 1 nor 2 are null vectors). We describe below the particular restrictions used in our empirical application. As usual, the probit structure of (13) and (14) identi…es parameters only up to a scalar transformation.
So we normalise the variances of u 1i and u 2i to unity at the outset in the normal way.
The 2SE is our favoured estimator owing to its ease of use and robustness relative to FIML. 17 However, we will report some limited estimates based on FIML because it facilitates estimation of the correlation coe¢ cient between the disturbances, which will be of independent interest (see below). The Appendix derives the likelihood function for this problem.
One econometric possibility that we do not investigate below is estimation of a …xed e¤ects panel version of the system (13) and (14) (or (16) and (18)). Just as the presence of individual …xed e¤ects prevents identi…cation of temporally static covariates, so it eliminates from samples estimated by logit or probit all individuals who do not change occupational status over the sample period -including the numerous interesting cases of 'survivors' who remain in business. This is inconsistent with the frame of reference of our theoretical analysis and the purpose of the present paper. As we now go on to explain, we will instead exploit the longitudinal nature of our data set in an e¤ort to disentangle knowledge spillovers from other possible sources of interdependent entrepreneurial choices.
Disentangling spillovers from other sources of interdependence
As noted earlier, knowledge spillovers might not be the only possible explanation for non-zero 1 and 2 values. We now consider several alternative explanations, and suggest ways of identifying them in the empirical work in an e¤ort to isolate spillover e¤ects.
One alternative explanation is assortative mating. The idea here is that individuals with similar unobserved tastes for entrepreneurship marry each other and then become entrepreneurs, leading to a spurious association between z 1 and z 2 . We test this possibility in two ways. First, unobserved tastes for entrepreneurship that are shared by spouses implies positive correlation between u 1 and u 2 in (13) and (14). This can be tested using a FIML estimator. Second, we dig into past waves of the data to explore a theme emerging from assortative mating research that links marriage outcomes to earlier shared work environments (see, e.g., Kalmijn and Flap, 2001 ). This research suggests that individuals with similar preferences often perform similar work and meet in the same or similar workplaces or occupations. If this phenomenon is relevant for explaining joint entrepreneurship, then at least as many entrepreneur couples should be found working in the same occupations and industries before marriage as are observed there afterwards (see also Nakosteen et al, 2004 , for a similar approach). This proposition can be tested directly using previous waves of PSID data. 18 And, re ‡ecting the fact that couples tend to match on the basis of education, we will also control below for spouse's education on an individual's decision to be an entrepreneur (see Wong, 1986) .
A second alternative explanation is role model, or demonstration, effects. If role models are important, individuals might emulate or eschew the occupational choice of their spouse, depending on whether a favourable or unfavourable role model is conveyed. This could cause such choices to covary even in the absence of knowledge spillovers. We distinguish role model e¤ects from knowledge transfers by testing whether one's choice to be an entrepreneur is in ‡uenced by one's spouse's record of success in entrepreneurship. Re ‡ecting data limitations in the PSID, we measure success in entrepreneurship as the length of the spouse's most recent continuous spell as a business owner. 19 We compute a variable of this kind for both spouses 1 8 A complication arises if women perceive business ownership to be a 'masculine' occupation that penalises them in the marriage market (Badgett and Folbre, 2003) . Then relatively few women will become entrepreneurs, leaving the set of observed married couples to be dominated by male entrepreneurs and female employees. This unobserved e¤ect would impart downward bias to estimates of 1 , though it should presumably leave estimates of 2 unbiased. We were unable to think of any ready proxy for this particular unobserved e¤ect.
1 9 Including spells up to and including the 2003 wave. The computation of this variable necessitated the calculation of work histories from previous waves of the PSID for every individual in the sample. We did not attempt to weight spells according to when they occurred; so, for example, a spell taking place between 1988 and 1995 was considered equivalent to one occurring between 1996 and 2003. We do not anticipate that our results will change if a weighting scheme is applied to the data. (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000) . Alternatively, greater wealth might reduce household risk and/or risk aversion. But if wealth turns out to be insigni…cant, then none of these explanations will receive support.
Fourth, as discussed in Section 2.3 above, spouses might co-ordinate occupational choices in order to diversify risk. The 'raw' 1 and 2 estimates would then embody both spillover and risk e¤ects. In an attempt to separate these factors, we will investigate the e¤ects of an additional control variable: the dummy variable 'Same industry', which takes the value of one if both members of a couple are located in the same 3-digit industry, and zero otherwise. If risk is industry-speci…c, then spouses who work in the same industry will be more vulnerable to covariant risk. As a further check, we will also utilise some limited information on risk attitudes in the data set to see if risk aversion is a salient issue anyway.
Finally, we acknowledge the possibility that, by enabling spouses to work alongside each other in the same enterprise, partnerships might be a particularly e¢ cient organisational form for transmitting knowledge spillovers.
We will test for this possibility by checking the impact of partnership organisation.
Data and variables

Data selection and dependent variables
The data for this study are taken from the PSID. The econometric analysis focuses on the most recent wave, 2003; earlier years of the panel were used to explore competing explanations of joint participation in entrepreneurship discussed above. Our sample comprises married working adults aged between 18 and 65, who were not working in agriculture. Our working de…-nition of entrepreneurship is taken to be business ownership, so cases were partitioned into business owner and non-business owner categories. The business ownership classi…cation is used because it recognises that entrepreneurs both create and operate business organisations; this classi…cation is also easy to apply, and has been used in several previous studies (e.g., Cagetti and De Nardi, 2001; Gentry and Hubbard, 2001; and Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) . Speci…cally, we utilise responses from the PSID questions that ask "Did you (or anyone else in the family) own a business or have a …nancial interest in any business enterprise?" After that, respondents are asked about the type of business, who in the family owned it, and whether the owner or spouse worked in the business. The PSID does not de…ne partnerships, so we were obliged to propose our own de…nition. We de…ned a couple as a partnership if both spouses worked in and also had part ownership of the same business. The stipulation of working in the business was designed to remove 'sleeping partners'motivated purely by tax shelter considerations. 22 Further to the impact of income taxation, we observe that the US system of joint taxation removes any incentive for business owner spouses to choose particular occupations in order to minimise tax liabilities:
see Schuetze (2004) .
In total, 659 (13.3% of) male and 337 (6.8% of) female respondents were classi…ed as business owners. Of these, 92 cases (=14.0% of the 659 men and 27.3% of the 337 females) were in partnerships with their spouses. In terms of self-employment, 12.3% of men and 8.4% of women in the sample were self-employed in their main job. There is incomplete overlap between the business ownership and self-employment classi…cations: only 70.0% and 54.9% of male and female business owners respectively were self-employed.
Of the 30.0% of men who were business owners but not self-employed, 70.1% owned incorporated businesses, and so were classi…ed as employees in their main job. The corresponding …gure for women was 57.2%. 23 The remaining 2 2 Of course, it is possible that some respondents classi…ed themselves inaccurately, e.g., some spouses of business owners who worked informally for the business recorded themselves as inactive or working in paid employment. Alternative classi…cations such as selfemployment status are also likely to be vulnerable to this problem (as are self-reported work hours). However, we believe that by giving respondents the opportunity to report work involvement separately from ownership, the PSID might reduce the scale of this problem. To the extent that it persists, mis-classi…cation will have ambiguous e¤ects on the interdependence of entrepreneurial choices, depending on whether the problem is greatest among business owners or employees.
2 3 Every individual with an incorporated business was a business owner.
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non-self-employed business owners tended to be employees in their main job, who worked in their business on a part-time basis. The incidence of this was higher among women than among men.
The empirical ambiguities and 'grey areas'arising from self-employment classi…cations are well known (see Dennis, 1996) . For this reason we will mainly report results for business ownership, and will interpret supplementary results based on the self-employment classi…cation with particular caution.
Explanatory variables
As noted in Section 3.1 above, both preferences and variables that a¤ect relative occupational incomes are likely to a¤ect the business ownership decision. To capture these in ‡uences, we followed previous researchers by including in the covariate vectors 1 and 2 (orthogonal polynomials of) age and age squared, 24 and dummy variables for whether the highest level of educational attainment was high school graduation or a completed college degree. To the extent that these variables measure human capital, they might either increase the likelihood of business ownership or reduce it, depending on how they a¤ect returns in business ownership relative to those in paid employment (van Praag, 2005) . Previous evidence has generally found participation rates in entrepreneurship to increase with age up to a maximum, before declining in later years; the results for own education levels are more mixed, though they have generally been found to be negative in the United States (Blanch ‡ower, 2004) . Other research has identi…ed a positive in ‡uence on income from one's spouse's education, which appears to be more pronounced for entrepreneurs than for workers (Wong, 1986 ).
This might capture another conduit for knowledge spillovers, with more educated individuals being able to usefully advise their spouses in business.
We also control for this possibility below. 25 And, to control for in ‡uences from family background, we also include dummies for high school educational attainment of parents, separately for mothers and fathers. 26 Previous research clearly shows that blacks and Latinos experience lower unconditional rates of business ownership and self-employment in the United
States (see, e.g., Fairlie, 2004) . As well as including dummy variables for ethnicity, we also control for broad regional location (Southern, North Central and North East) and urban density, where we de…ne a location with a 'high' urban density as one with more than one million people; and a 'medium' urban density as one containing between a quarter and one million people.
Previous research has found mixed e¤ects for population density on business ownership and …rm formation rates (c.f. Brock and Evans, 1986, and Reynolds et al, 1994) . And, following some previous researchers who report an impact of health on self-employment propensities (Fuchs, 1982; Borjas, 1986; Rees and Shah, 1986; Gill, 1988) , we also include dummy variables coded to one if individuals and their spouses report that they su¤er from poor health. Finally, we control for a range of family factors, including the number of children in the household and the number of children under six years old. Supporting children might increase the necessity both of lucrative work and of ‡exible job schedules, while infants under 6 years old may constrain the ability of parents to work regular hours. These factors have been found by some previous researchers, for example, to help explain female business ownership patterns (Macpherson, 1988; Caputo and Dolin-sky, 1998; Bruce, 1999; and Lombard, 2001 ; but see also Taniguchi, 2002) .
We also include variables measuring the average weekly hours spent doing housework of each individual and their spouse. Previous studies show that women tend to do more housework than men on average (Hundley, 2001; Edwards and Field-Hendrey, 2002) .
Identifying restrictions are suggested by the likelihood that -once occupational interdependence is taken into account -a woman's age (and its square), her father's and mother's education, and her ethnicity will a¤ect her occupational choice but not that of her husband (and likewise for men).
In addition, re ‡ecting widespread evidence that the presence of children in the household a¤ects female more than male attitudes to work, this variable and the age of the youngest child are excluded from the male speci…cation. 27
Summary statistics of the variables used in the study are collected in Table 1 . 28 Consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Parker, 2004, Chap. 3), business owners tend on average to be older, slightly better educated, and from families where the father was more likely to be a college graduate.
They are also more likely to be white and live as owner-occupiers in less densely populated areas than non-business owners. 29 A third of male business owners had wives who were also business owners, while 51 per cent 2 7 Likelihood ratio tests yielded 2 (8) = 12:712 for men and 2 (6) = 4:496 for women, so we were unable to reject these over-identifying restrictions. Checks also revealed that the estimates of 1 and 2 given below were insensitive to these restrictions.
2 8 All statistics are based on unweighted data, as it is unclear how our reduced sample of married couples could be re-weighted to make it nationally representative. Neither do we include Heckman selectivity terms, since we do not attempt to generalise our …ndings beyond working married couples; were we to do so we would face the practical impediment of …nding appropriate identifying instruments. In this context it is noteworthy that the only study we know of that attempts this (Macpherson, 1988) found insigni…cant participation selection e¤ects for self-employment choices of American women.
2 9 The low business ownership rate of Latinos is striking. Two possible reasons are the exclusion of agricultural families from the sample, and under-representation in the PSID of newer waves of Latino immigrants. The latter problem has been recognised and partly addressed by the PSID in a special supplemental Latino sample; but these individuals do not form part of the core PSID. I am grateful to Rob Fairlie for discussions on these issues.
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of female business owners had husbands who were business owners. These …gures might appear high in view of the health insurance bene…t to business owners of having an employed spouse who can include them in their company insurance cover (Perry and Rosen, 2004) . In fact, self-employed Americans have been able to deduct health premiums from their business expenses (in their entirety since 2003); this attenuates the health insurance advantage of having an employed as opposed to a business owner spouse.
Results
Before presenting the results from estimating (13) and (14), for comparative purposes we brie ‡y summarise results from a benchmark case without interdependent business ownership, i.e., for the case where 1 = 2 = 0 is imposed at the outset. It turned out that the results for this case were broadly similar to those reported by previous researchers. For men, business ownership propensities were found to be increasing but concave in age, and signi…cantly lower for blacks, Latinos, and respondents in relatively poor health. Among women, blacks and Latinos were again signi…cantly less likely to be business owners, as were older respondents in poor health and high-school graduates. Women with children located in rural areas outside the South were signi…cantly more likely to be business owners than the average woman. Table 2 presents the results from estimating (13) and (14) by Maddala's two-step estimator. The table reveals substantial positive occupational interdependence, with both husbands and wives being signi…-cantly more likely to own a business if their spouse does too. This is consistent with the notion of positive occupational spillovers although, as noted above, other interpretations are also possible which we go on to explore 26 below. While females appear to bene…t a little more from interdependence than males do, the gender di¤erence in the s is relatively modest. The marginal e¤ects corresponding to the 1 and 2 estimates are 0.12 and 0. 09. 30 This means, for example, that if a man's wife is certain of being a business owner, this will increase the probability that the man will become a business owner by 12 percentage points relative to the case where the wife is certain not to be a business owner. These are relatively large e¤ects compared with the unconditional sample probabilities of business ownership of 13.3% for men and 6.8% for women.
Columns I of
A few other covariates are signi…cantly associated with business ownership, including own college education (negatively); and spouse's education and household production (both positively). The negative e¤ect of own higher education on business ownership in the United States has been documented before (Blanch ‡ower, 2004) . In principle, this …nding is consistent with the view that well educated specialists are less likely to pursue the path of independent business ownership than 'jacks of all trades' (Lazear, 2002 (Lazear, , 2004 . The positive e¤ect of spouse's education is to the best of our knowledge a novel ancillary result for the US, and consistent with Wong's (1986) …ndings for Hong Kong entrepreneurs. This might identify another conduit for knowledge spillovers. What is striking is the smaller set of signi…cant covariates in columns I compared with the 'conventional'case where business ownership rates of married couples are assumed to be independent.
Most notably, this includes the insigni…cance of children on female business ownership, in contrast to previous single equation estimates obtained earlier (see above) and previous authors (see Macpherson, 1988; Caputo and Dolinsky, 1998; and Bruce, 1999) . At the general level, it illustrates our earlier point that single equation reduced form estimates can be misleading.
In the present context, failing to control for spouses'endogenous work patterns might show up through other manifestations of household structure, such as those relating to children. To understand business ownership patterns of married Americans, it appears necessary to take into account the occupational choices of spouses.
Next, we re-estimated model I by FIML. Using the 2SE starting values, the correlation coe¢ cient was estimated to be 0:14, with a standard error of 0:53. 31 Thus while this …nding does not rule out assortative mating based on a range of observable criteria (e.g., ethnicity and education), it does not suggest that joint business ownership can be understood in terms of spouses sharing correlated unobserved preferences. To explore this matter further, we asked whether members of married couples share similar tastes that are embodied in the choice of similar industries or occupations prior to marriage. If future couples meet in jobs into which individuals purposively self-select, then large numbers of married couples should be observed working in the same industries and occupations before marriage compared with afterwards. We checked the proportions of married couples whose members both belong to the same 3-digit occupation and industry in 2003. The …g-ures were 18.23% and 12.53%, respectively. Among the couples who were unmarried 10 years before, however, the proportions were only 2.82% and 4.32%, respectively. So far from marriage bringing people together from similar jobs, it seems that -in this sample at least -the occupational choices of spouses converge after they marry. Of course, this …nding might also capture age e¤ects, as there is known to be greater variability in workers' job types when they are younger. But is does suggest that any unobserved correlated occupational choice e¤ects are not strong enough to be identi…ed in the data. And while it is possible that unobserved characteristics predispose members of some couples to choose similar occupations later in life, as noted above the FIML estimates cast doubt on this explanation.
Assortative mating is only one alternative explanation for interdependent business ownership decisions. Another is role model, or demonstration, e¤ects. To test this, columns II of Table 2 augment the speci…cation with the Role model variable described in Section 3.3. The …nal row of the table indicates signi…cant negative e¤ects from this variable. The implication is that having a spouse who has spent a long time as a business owner tends to deter individuals from trying it themselves. Taken literally, these …nd-ings are consistent with previous evidence that business ownership can have undesirable side e¤ects on one's personal life (such as excessive work hours and relationship stress) that are reinforced by longer exposure to the phenomenon -and which deter spouses from trying it themselves (see, e.g., Williams, 2003; and Blanch ‡ower, 2004) . For instance, consider the e¤ects on a person whose spouse had (a) been a business owner for a long time in the past, but (b) is very unlikely to be a business owner now. This is consistent with an outcome in which the wife was unwilling to abandon her business in the past, perhaps battling against the odds to keep it going, and being 'scarred'by the experience of ultimate business failure. The results in columns II suggest that this kind of battling experience deters the spouse from trying business ownership as well. 32 Of course, this is no more than a way of visualising these …ndings, and is certainly not the only possible Perhaps more centrally, the estimated coe¢ cients on the role model dummy are inconsistent with the notion that this variable is conveying positive knowledge spillovers, since they are negative rather than positive. 33 Thus we infer that spillovers are being conveyed through 1 and 2 , which have both increased in magnitude, while remaining highly statistically signi…cant (the corresponding marginal e¤ects also increase, to 0.17 for men and 0.15 for women). The e¤ects of most other variables remain similar to those reported in columns I. The principal exception is that for males, spouse's housework, poor health, and high school education become signi…-cantly positive, as does being black. 34 Table 3 provide further augmentations of the econometric speci…cation in order to test alternatives to the knowledge spillover story. 35 Column III adds a measure of net household wealth to the speci…cation. Household wealth rather than spouse's wealth was used, as the latter is unavailable in the PSID. (We acknowledge that this may constitute a limitation of this particular empirical test). 82 missing wealth values reduced the sample size to 4769. In order to reduce endogeneity problems (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004) , whereby wealth at time t could be an outcome of business success at time t, we constructed a wealth variable based on household assets (including home equity) two years before the sample date. 36 Since negative values of wealth, 3 3 See footnote 21. The negative sign is opposite to what Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) found for the in ‡uence of parental self-employment on children's propensity to be selfemployed. It seems plausible that spouses convey the downsides of being a business owner more tangibly at the time they are business owners than parents do to o¤spring during the latter's childhood and adolescence.
3 4 This particular empirical result appears to be a good example of how (single equation) reduced form estimates can lead to misleading interpretations compared to those obtained from a (simultaneous equation) structural model.
3 5 Because few coe¢ cient estimates change, only the key ones are included in this table to save space. Detailed results are available from the author on request.
3 6 Because it is still possible that wealth is correlated with characteristics that a¤ect the ownership decision, e.g., ability, we tried instrumenting wealth by lagged wealth, x, were observed in the data, values were transformed according to the formula ln(x+1) if x 0 and ln( x+1) if x < 0 (this is similar to the arc sine transformation). It is readily seen that the coe¢ cients on the lagged wealth variable are numerically small, 'wrongly signed'for males, and statistically insigni…cant for women. At the same time, the coe¢ cients remain large in absolute value and statistically signi…cant. These results are the opposite of what one would expect if interdependence in entrepreneurial choice merely re ‡ected superior access to (a spouse's) resources. They are also consistent with recent research …ndings by Hurst and Lusardi (2004) , who found little evidence that wealth drives participation in entrepreneurship. 37 On the other hand, it is possible that business wealth is non-fungible so that business owner couples have a greater tendency to stay together when their marriages founder. Then once again, joint business ownership might occur for a reason other than knowledge spillovers. If this hypothesis is true, business owners should have life histories characterised by a lower incidence of divorce and separation than non-business owners. In fact, whereas 32.8% of male business owners in the sample had experienced more than one marriage ending in separation or divorce, only 26.5% of male non-business owners had. The corresponding …gures for women were 36.5% and 26.7%, respectively. This casts doubt on an explanation based on lower divorce rates associated with non-fungible assets.
In an attempt to identify risk e¤ects separately from knowledge spillovers, employment status, and other covariates used in Table 2 . But this made no substantive di¤erence to the results (available on request). In fact, any remaining endogeneity is likely to impart an upward bias to estimates of the entrepreneurship-wealth relationship; so any …nding of an insigni…cant relationship might be taken as strong evidence that it is not empirically important.
columns IV in Table 3 augment III with the dummy variable 'Same industry', which takes the value one if both members of a couple are working in the same 3-digit industry. All else equal, if risk-averse individuals face covariant risk and work in the same industry as their spouse, then a negative coe¢ cient on 'Same industry'should be observed; the opposite should hold if individuals face diversifying risks. At the same time, the analysis of Section 2.3 suggests that 1 and 2 will increase (resp., decrease) in the presence of covariant (resp., diversifying) risk. In line with our expectations of covariant risk, the coe¢ cients on the 'Same industry'dummy turn out to be negative. They are statistically signi…cant only for males, while the estimates (and marginal e¤ects) are unchanged for men and actually drop for women. Hence controlling for risk in this way does not change our central …ndings. 38 As a further check on the role of risk, we next included controls for relative risk aversion. Based on the survey methodology of Barsky et al (1997) , these data were backed out of responses to PSID questions about the willingness of respondents to take jobs with di¤erent hypothetical income prospects, but the same non-monetary attributes as their current job. 39 Data on an inverse measure of risk aversion ('risk tolerance') were distributed with the 1996 PSID, though not every respondent answered this question -or was participating in the PSID at that time. The net e¤ect of using the risk aversion variable is to cut down our sample size by 1327 observations, with implicit selection of older respondents. Hence the results that follow should be treated with some caution. If attitudes to risk are important, one would expect a negative e¤ect of risk aversion on the propensity to be a business owner (Kihlstrom and La¤ont, 1979) . Columns V of Table 3 report the estimates; but these are found to be small and statistically insigni…cant, while the coe¢ cient on 'Same industry'becomes insigni…cant for men as well as women. The relative lack of importance of risk attitudes (found also by Barsky et al, 1997) might explain the limited evidence of risk e¤ects observed above.
Finally, Table 4 presents results derived using two alternative sample de…nitions: self-employment (columns VI) and non-partnerships (columns VII). The speci…cation used for comparative purposes was that of columns II, because this conserves the largest sample size while retaining the generally signi…cant 'Role model'covariate. In the …rst alternative sample de…nition, respondents were partitioned according to whether they were self-employed or employees in their main job. 40 It has been argued that self-employment is not a coherent occupation at all, but resembles more of a legal classi…cation (Dennis, 1996) . It covers a wider range of vocations and professions than business ownership, including casual and seasonal jobs like window-cleaning as well as lucrative medical practices and management consultancies. Because it is more heterogeneous than business ownership, one might expect to …nd less interdependence between self-employment statuses of husbands and wives. In fact, columns VI reveal that the results are similar to those obtained directly using the business ownership classi…cation. The results for women accord with previous …ndings of a positive e¤ect on female selfemployment of having a self-employed husband (e.g., Bruce, 1999) . The coe¢ cients on the other variables were qualitatively similar to those reported in column II so are not repeated for brevity. In column VII, we exclude partnership businesses from the sample, resulting in a slight drop in sample size to 4759. This change in sample de…nition decreases the implied spillover received by women while barely a¤ecting that received by men from column II. This may suggest that men receive spillovers irrespective of the organisational form of the business; while partnerships are an especially e¢ cient conduit for transmitting spillovers to women.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the determinants of entrepreneurship. We have proposed a framework of joint utility maximisation in which married people can exploit knowledge spillovers from their spouses.
Married couples are an especially important group to analyse in the context of entrepreneurship because they make up the majority of business owners in America. We showed that individuals'choices of business ownership can in principle a¤ect the choices of their spouses in a positive or negative fashion.
Using a recent sample of PSID data, we found strong evidence of substantial positive interdependence between couples' business ownership choices.
Furthermore, interdependence appears to play a major role in explaining patterns of business ownership in the United States. Further investigation suggests that knowledge spillovers are a reasonable interpretation of these …ndings; alternative explanations did not receive empirical support.
Because the value of spillovers can be expected to vary over time and di¤erent labour market conditions, caution should be exercised in the interpretation of our speci…c results. We also acknowledge the limitations of some of the empirical proxies used to test alternative explanations of interdependent business ownership. However, both our conceptual and empirical analyses suggest that neglecting interdependencies within couples may generate misleading results about the determinants of entrepreneurship; future research should take account of this. In particular, when researchers use samples of entrepreneurs containing numerous married couples, they should beware of endowing reduced form single equation logit/probit models with a structural interpretation. This issue may be of growing importance as the incidence of female business ownership in the United States continues to grow (Devine, 1994a (Devine, , 1994b Lombard, 2001) .
We anticipate that the general methodology developed in this article may be usefully extended and applied to other occupations, especially ones in which there is abundant specialised information and knowledge that is not easily dispersed to 'outsiders'. Another application might be to countries where nepotism regulates entry to desirable jobs, and where being established in a desirable job opens doors to entry by spouses or close relatives, Finally, future work might also explore the e¤ects of knowledge spillovers on business success: for example, company longevity or pro…tability. Previous research has found that determinants of entry into entrepreneurship generally di¤er from those of successful entrepreneurship, so extra insights might ‡ow from an investigation of this issue; this particular problem might be tackled within a simultaneous tobit framework, for example. The prospect of connecting household participation in entrepreneurship with business success is an enticing one, that is likely to attract both academic and policy interest. 
The log-likelihood function has several terms, re ‡ecting the probabilities of the four outcomes of: (a) joint participation (z i1 = z i2 = 1); (b) joint non-participation (z i1 = z i2 = 0); and (c) and (d) mixed participation (z i1 = 1 z i2 = 0 and z i2 = 1 z i1 = 0). The problem of estimating (15) and (17) subject to (20), (21) and (22) 
